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I. INTRODUCTION
More than a dozen times in the past five Terms, the Supreme Court
has reversed a n appellate court's decision granting post-conviction
habeas relief to a state prisoner: not because it concluded that the state
court had acted correctly, but because the state court's error was neither
contrary to , n o r a n unreasonable application o f , cle a rly established
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court: which is the standard
of review prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act o f 1996 (AEDPA).
2
without
cla rifyin g wh ich legal rules actually applied t o the habeas
M o r e o vleea vin
proceedings,
r , g ce n tra l questions o f constitutional c rimin a l
t
procedure
h
eunanswered.
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Emblematic
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r o f this trend is the January 2008 decision in Wright v.
tVan Patten,
d3 i ne
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i
dw h e i c d
ah
l
1
panel
at
h the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, for my participa-lt
tion
A
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and Caprice Roberts—for their camaraderie and their comments, to Carolyn Robbs and the
sfFrost,
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I. SeesWright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743 (2008) (per curiam); Utrecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1
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e
(2007); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Rice v.
e
u546 U.S. 333 (2006); Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005) (per curiam); Bradshaw v.
is
Collins,
cStumpf,
a
m m
545 a
U.S. 175 (2005); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447
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(2005)
(per
Holland v. Jackson., 542 U.S. 649 (2004) (per curiam); Yarborough v.
r icuriam);
e
e
Alvarado,
541
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(2004); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) (per curiam); Mitchell v.
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Esparza,
540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam).
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r
e S. Ct. 743.
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fr
without
the benefit of additional briefing or oral argument. I t is hardly exaggerating to suggest that a
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decision granting habeas r elief based on the petitioner's c laim o f
ineffective assistance of counse1.
his
had been violated because his lawyer
5 SSixth
p e cAmendment
i fi c a l l yrights
,
participated
V
a
nin his plea colloquy by speakerphone. Apply ing the twoprong,
circumstance-specific
test for ineffectiveness enunciated by the
P a t t e n
Supreme
Court
in
Strickland
c
l
a
i
m
e v. Washington,
Appeals
Patten's
concluding that there was no
6
W i sVan
c o
n s i claim,
n
d t h e rejected
evidence
that
the
physical
absence
of
his
counsel resulted in prejudice!
C
o
u
r
t
t
h
a
On
post-conviction
habeas
corpus,
the
U.S.
District Court for the Eastern
o
f
t
District of Wisconsin agreed.
The Seventh Circuit reversed,
8
was the
9 incorrect
c o n c standard
l u d i n tog apply to Van Patten's claim, and that the
Wisconsin
Court
of
t h a t Appeals should have instead applied the categorical
presumption
articulated in United States v. Cronie."
t
h of ineffectiveness
e
the
state
court's
error
was
)Because
S t r i c k l a not harmless, and because Cronic was
unquestionably
"clearly established" precedent
n d
-concluded
that
habeas
, t ht e Se e v esreliefwas
n t h warranted
-certiorari, the :Supreme Court took no position on whether
C i On
t r c u i t ,
Cronic or Strickland Was the appropriate test to apply in such circumstances. I t merely noted that the answer to that question was unclear, and
so it could not have been "contrary to or an unreasonable application o r
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, for
the Wisconsihstate courts t o
a p p l y
that postsummary reversals) have come in cases like Von Fatten--where the Court of Appeals
tconviction
h habeas
e relief was watTanted under AEDPA, and the Supreme Court reversed.
S t5. See
r Van
i Patten
c v.
k Endicott, 489 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), rev'd, 128 S Ct. 743.
The
l aCourtnhaddpreviously vacated the Seventh C t r a't's earlier decision in Van Patten v. Deppish,
434 1
s7 adin,
t 549aU.S. 70
n (2006). S r Schmidt v, Van e t. 549 17'S 1163 (2007) (mem.). C r
'cmard
.d
3 d athe Same
r panel
d reaffirmed its earlier decision. a i t h one dissent. 'See Van Patten.
F.3a
at 828-2) (Coffey, J., dissenting)
1
0
V 6. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
3 8
le decision review
a
7 gee State v. Van Patten, 568
2d 653 (Wis. App.) (unpublished
(
denied,
576
N.W.2d
280
(Wis.
1997).
n
7
8. See Van Fatten, 434 F.3d at (04 —42 (summarizing the background).
tP 9. Sec a
i d at 1042-45.
h
10. 466
t
t U.S. 648 (1984), C r oni e w d e u d e a b
C
Strickland.
y , t which
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e m e to the lower courts' confusion as to what constituted
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b
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lost, in other words, not because there was no precedent, but because it
was unclear which precedent applied.
In a postscript to its brief opinion, the Van Patten Court agreed with
Wisconsin's argument that the Seventh Circuit could have reached the
same result in a direct federal appeal, but emphasized that "[o]ur own
consideration of the merits of telephone practice i s for another day,
and this case turns on the recognition that no clearly established law
contrary to the state court's conclusion justifies collateral relief."" Put
another way, even if the Court was convinced that the Seventh Circuit
was correct—that Cronic is the appropriate test to apply in such cases—
it refused to say so, resting its decision on its belief that the Wisconsin
state courts did not act unreasonably.
I4 Van Patten is hardly alone in this regard. Every year brings with it
a new wave of scholarship attacking the deferential review called for by
AEDPA,
frustration
with the minimalist inquiry they are allowed to undertake in
I5
post-conviction
habeas c a s e s
a n d
ness
of
trial
court
errors, as opposed to the actual impact of those errors
1
n6 e
on
the
—
n fairness
i n q or
u accuracy
i r y of the underlying proceedings."
w a
co e
p n t e r e d
o
i n i n
to n13. Id.h at 747. e
rs e
14. Indeed,
a Justice
s Stevens
o nwentaso far as to suggest that the only reason why Van Patten was
not
entitled
to
habeas
relief
was because of a "drafting" error (that he, as the author of the majority
b l e opinion, made) in Cronic. See id. at 747-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). As Stevens
y
explained,
"In light of Cronic's references to the 'complete denial of counsel' and 'totally absent'
counsel,
and the opinion's failure to state more explicitly that the defendant is entitled to ' the
l
presence o f counsel [i n open cour t]; I acquiesce i n this Court's conclusion that the state-court
o
decision
was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." Id. at 748. In other
words, by simply omitting the words "in open court," Cronic failed to clarify what it meant—that the
w
physical absence of counsel triggered a categorical presumption of ineffective assistance. See also
e
id. ("The fact that in 1984, when Cronic was decided, neither the parties nor the Court contemplated
rrepresentation by attorneys who were not present in the flesh explains the author's failure to add the
words
c 'in open court' after the word 'present.'").
15. For a small sampling, see John H . Blume, AEDPA.• The "Hype" and the "Bite," 91
o
CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2006); James S. Liebman W i l l i am F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The
Quantity
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 CoLtim. L. REV. 696
u
(1998); Todd Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for "Reasonably Erroneous"
rApplications o f Federal Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2002); and Joseph M . Brunner, Comment,
tNegating Precedent and (Selectively) Suspending Stare Decisis: AEDPA and Problems for the
Article
III Hierarchy, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 307 (2006).
j
16. See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2007). Al though the panel i n Irons
u
concluded
that circuit precedent precluded them fr om reaching the question o f AEDPA' s
constitutionality afresh, see id. at 854 n.5, two of the three judges penned concurrences bemoaning
d
the extent to which AEDPA ties the hands of reviewing courts. See id. at 854-59 (Noonan, J.,
g
concurring); id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially).
e 17. See id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially) ("Congress tells us in AEDPA that we
may
s not grant relief to citizens who are being held in prison in violation of their constitutional rights
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
i
n
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An equally constraining aspect of AEDPA warrants criticism. I n
addition to affirming the deferential nature of review under AEDPA, the
Supreme Court has concluded that only it s holdings, not dicta,
may provide the basis for relief under the statute.
Justices
I8 I n themselves
o t h epretermitted
r
w otherpossibility
d s , that, even while denying
relief
in
AEDPA
cases,
the
Supreme
Court
might still enunciate forwardt
h
e
looking principles of constitutional law. Because the Court can only
grant relief under AEDPA i f the result was foreordained by its precedents, the federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular,
will never have the opportunity to make new law in cases in which
AEDPA denies relief. 19 (That is, unless the reviewing court reached the
error question first—a step that this article will argue is necessarily antecedent to the question of whether the law providing the basis for the state
court's error was "clearly established" by the Supreme Court.)
The effect of these two shortcomings—the Court's decisions not to
reach the issue o f error where the lower court's action survives
AEDPA's deferential standard of review, and the Court's decision that
only holdings and not dicta can provide the basis for relief under
AEDPA i s significant. U n t il the Court does reach questions like the
one it avoided in Van Patten, criminal defendants across the country may
be convicted using procedures suffering from the same identified (and
litigated) constitutional defect. And, because of AEDPA and the Court's
unwillingness to apply its holdings retroactivity, i t w ill be all but
impossible for those defendants to benefit from such a future Supreme
Court decision unless their direct appeal is still pending when the later
decision is handed down." F or example, defendants convicted in the
time between when Van Patten is decided (call it T
cal
o future case where the Court actually does reach the issue (call it TO
) a n d
t h e
h
y
p
o
t
h error
e tthati led
- to their unlawful conviction or sentence is one that could not
unless the constitutional
have been made by a reasonable jurist.").
18. See Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Because there were two different cases
decided by the Supreme Court during its 1999 Term captioned "Williams v, Taylor," the convention
is to use the petitioners' full names in identifying the cases. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER'STHE FEDERALCOURTSAND THEFEDERALSYSTEM 1335
19. That does not mean that relief is never warranted under AEDPA. On a host of occasions in
recent( Terms,
upheld
36
5 t h theeCourt
d .has granted
2 0 (or
0 3
) . a lower court's grant of) relief in AEDPA cases
because the underlying state court decisions were so inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007);
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). In each case, though, the
majority opinion relied on prior decisional law—as AEDPA commands.
20. Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a habeas petitioner may only invoke a "new
rule" of criminal procedure—one formulated after his conviction—if the rule is a "watershed rule of
criminal procedure," or one that goes to the constitutionality of the substance of his conviction. See,
e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406,416-17 (2007).
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will be unable to prevail in their habeas petitions on an argument similar
to that advanced by Van Patten—that Cronic, and not Strickland,
governs their claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. So even if it was
unnecessary to reach the constitutional question in Van Patten's case—
because he would lose under AEDPA anyway—the Court's avoidance at
T
As the Van Patten Court itself suggested, the other obvious (and
o
traditional)
way around AEDPA would be for the Court to articulate the
m
relevant
substantive
legal standard in the context o f direct criminal
a
appeals,
in which AEDPA's deferential standard o f review does not
y
apply!'
But
as theoretically appealing as that option is, its practical likew
lihood
runs
squarely
into the (shrinking) size of the Supreme Court's
e
docket,
l
arising
out of direct criminal appeals, especially criminal appeals from
22
lthe state courts.
a n d
p
part
23
I nhear direct criminal appeals from the state courts would at best
t hto
rmitigate,
se h o r rather
t , than obviate, the significance of the Court's ability to
e
enunciate
new
principles of constitutional law in the context of poste
v
e
c o
cn
conviction
review.
r r e
la
In other contexts, the Court has shown far less reluctance to reach
s p
u
questions
m
o of constitutional law even if they may not be necessary to the
o
n sub
case
judice. Most familiarly, in the context of its qualified immunity
d
rd i ne
jurisprudence,
the Court for a time endorsed a rigid "order-of-battle"
e
cg l oy n
pursuant
to
which
reviewing courts would decide whether the plaintiff
rc e r
shad alleged a violation of a constitutional right before deciding whether
e
tm e
dwas "clearly established,"
that
le right
f
to
a immunity.
T h a t is, the courts were required to reach the "rights"
24
if o or w h e t h e r
tle h
e
t fi c e r
orlf 21.
f There
is also a small class of cases where AEDPA does not apply to state prisoners
o
p
w
a
s r convictions i n feder al court—usually because t he underlying
collaterally
attacking
thei
fn
constitutional
eo
n claim
t was
i nott presented
l
eto the state court, and yet it was also not defaulted, or any
default
was excusable. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 539 (2006). That AEDPA does not
tdr
constrain
the federal courts' powers in those cases, though, does not change the effect that forwardrh
looking
c
pronouncements of constitutional law would have in A EDPA cases.
d
e
e 22. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Incredible Shrinking
e
Jn
u
Docket,
TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at 64; see also Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme
fs
t TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at Al.
Court,
N.Y.
t
e
ia 23.cFor a particularly good treatment of this issue, see Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch,
Initiating
a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA o f Seeking
n
e
sfrom Judgments of State Courts, 50 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2008).
g
Certiorari
d
'e 24. There is some debate about whether Congress i n AEDPA meant to codify "clearly
a
established"
law as i t was then understood i n the Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence.
o
Compare,
e.g., Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 n.12 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.),
n
with
f O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1998). F or present purposes, whether the
t are congruent or merely analogus is irrelevant.
terms
g
s
r
c
a
o
n
n
t
v
e
i
d
c
c
t
a
e
s
d
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question as a necessary antecedent to whether the defendant could be
held liable.
25 Named the "Saucier sequence" f o r the 2001 decision that
formalized it, this order of decision-making was the subject of substantial
criticism from commentators, lower court judges, and even some of the
Justices responsible for it .
January
2009
decision
in Pearson v. Callahan,
26 T h
e s
e
unanimously
overruled
Saucier.
27
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
t AshJustice
e Alito wrote for the Court,
c r i t i q u e s
J
sl m
ttheisequence
s forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it
c u[W]hile
i c n e set
a should
t e no
d longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the disi trict courts
n and the courts of appealsshould be permitted to exercise
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
t their sound
h
qualified
immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the
e
circumstances in the particular case at hand.
C
o
u
28
At
of
r
t the heart
'
s the critiques that led to Saucier's overruling in
Callahan are a series of inter-related concerns: that Saucier required
courts to unnecessarily decide questions of constitutional law; that such
decisions were often "cert-proof" if the defendant prevailed on qualified
immunity grounds anyway; that it forced courts to decide constitutional
questions on underdeveloped factual records; and so on. Alth o u g h the

Court opined that courts generally should reach the rights question first
in qualified immunity cases, the tide o f scholarly opinion seems to
support the Court's rejection of the mandatory methodological approach
that Saucier commanded.
29 This Essay suggests that many o f the same reasons wh y Saucier
proved so controversial—and perhaps even unworkable—in qualified
immunity cases are less salient in the context of post-conviction habeas
corpus, where the value of reaching potentially unnecessary questions of
constitutional law far outweighs the cost. Put another way, my thesis is
that, even though the Saucier sequence is no longer mandatory in
qualified immunity jurisprudence, such a rigid methodological order o f
battle would be o f great utility in the context o f post-conviction habeas

corpus—and in the adjudication of "new" rules of criminal law more

25. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808
(2009).
26. See, e.g., Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 817-18 (citing cases and articles).
27. 129 S. Ct. 808.
28. Id. at 818.
29. To be fair, as I note below, there are certainly scholars and jurists who support the Saucier
approach. But as much as they are in the minority, my goal in this essay is not to ask whether they
have the better argument, but to ask instead whether Saucier's approach might have greater utility
(and fewer shortcomings) in the context of post-conviction habeas cases under AEDPA.
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generally. I n that context, this Essay argues, the case for rights-first
constitutional adjudication is far stronger.
To elaborate upon this argument, Part II begins with a brief descriptive overview o f the Supreme Court's post-conviction habeas corpus
jurisprudence, focusing on the particular significance of "new" rules of
criminal law, and their applicability. Pa r t III introduces the Court's
qualified immunity case law, and explores both the origins of the Saucier
sequence and the growing criticisms of the rights-first approach that led
to its overruling this Term in Callahan. Finally, Part III turns to whether
the Saucier sequence could be extrapolated into the context of postconviction habeas corpus, considering both why it might work, and
the counterarguments against it. Ultimately , as this Essay concludes,
although AEDPA's deferential standard o f review crystallizes the
problem that federal courts face in post-conviction habeas cases today,
the need for rights-first adjudication in that context actually predates the
1996 statute—and will survive any legislative attempt to repeal it.
"NEW" CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CRIMINAL CASES
Before turning to the particular complexities added by AEDPA, a
brief survey is warranted of the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence with
respect to post-conviction relief (through both direct appeals or habeas
corpus), without which it would be difficult to understand the stakes
when the Court declines to reach questions of constitutional significance
in criminal cases.
A. Retroactivity and the Problem of New Rules
As the m)
conventional wisdom goes, the Supreme Court first began
seriously grappling with the extent to which new constitutional rules
should apply retroactively in criminal cases in the early 1960s.
timing
31 Tmakes
h e sense in several respects, since the Court had begun (1)
endorsing a more robust view o f the scope o f federal habeas corpus
review of state court convictions;
of the
protections that might apply to state-court
32
a relevant
n d
( constitutional
2 )
proceedings
in
the
first
place.
e m b r a c i n g
33
a
f
a
r
30. Much o f the discussion that follows is derived from the treatment of retroactivity i n
b
r
o
a ET AL.,
d supra
e note 18, at 1325-35.
habeas corpus in FALLON
31.
See,
e.g.,
Danforth
v.
Minnesota,
128 S. Ct. 1029,1036-37 (2008).
r
32. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
v
i
e
33. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
w
(1968);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
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The issue o f retroactivity f o r post-conviction r elief was first
confronted in the 1965 case of Linkletter v. Walk er.
34
h e
La three-part
i n k test,
l holding
e t tthatetherretroactive effect of a
CourtTenunciated
new rule of criminal law "should be determined on a case-by-case basis
by examining the purpose of the rule, the reliance of the States on the
prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive
application of the mle."
Court
35 Alater
l t expanded
h o u g its
h holding to encompass direct criminal appeals as
w
e
1
1
L i n k l e t t
rule
3
e 6r for retroactivity applied to a defendant whose direct appeal was still
pending
as
whose appeal had become final, but who sub—
w
a to a defendant
s
sequently
invoked
the
same
claim in a post-conviction habeas petition.
mea
a
So
long
as
the
relevant
legal
development post-dated the defendant's
n
h i n ga
b
conviction,
standard was the same.
te h a the
s
Justice Harlan ( the younger) disagreed w it h this approach.
a
c t
a
He wrote separately in a series of cases to argue that the Linkletter test
,s
e
, that the relevant standard should instead be a brightwas unworkable
and
u
tline distinction between direct appeals and post-conviction c laims .
n
h
Culminating
with his dissent in Desist v. United States,
37
d
e
opinion
in
Mackey
38 a n d h i sv. United
s e States,
p a r a t e
e
Court's
39 J udecisions
s t i c eshould apply "retroactively" to all cases where the
rH
defendant's
a r l direct
a n appeal was s till pending, but should not generally
taapplyr retroactively
g u evia dpost-conviction habeas petitions. Emphasizing
h
the
Justice Harlan suggested that the only
t significance
h
a o f "finality,"
t
e
exceptions
in
habeas
cases
should
be where the petitioner attacked the
t
h
e
constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted,
W
of those procedures that, as so aptly described
40 o rof nonobservance
" f o r
aclaims
by
r Justice Cardozo i n Palko v . Connecticut, are 'implic it i n the
r
e(1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This list is hardly exhaustive, and a series of decisions
nincorporating other provisions of the Bill of Rights predated the Warren Court. B u t it should go
without saying that the incorporation of much of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments
C
against the states dramatically expanded the scope of claims that could give rise to meritorious postoconviction federal habeas petitions.
34. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
u 35. Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1036-37 (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629).
r 36. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
t(1966).
37. Justice Harlan concurred in Linkletter and its progeny: "I thought it important to limit the
'impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to me profoundly unsound in principle." Desist v.
sUnited States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 258 ( I I ] can no longer r e m a i n content with the doctrinal confusion that has
jcharacterized our efforts to apply the basic Linkletter principle. 'Retroactivity' must be rethought.").
u 39. 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (mem.) (Harlan, J., concurring i n the judgment i n part and
in part).
rdissenting
40. See id. at 692-93.
i
s
p
r
u
d
e
n
c
e
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concept of ordered lib e r t y .
habeas
only whether the petitioner's trial was
4 I O courts
t h e should
r w i sconsider
e ,
constitutional
based
on
the
law
as
it then existed.
a c c o r d i n
The Supreme Court would ultimately embrace Justice Harlan's
g
views
in the
t
o late 1980s. The first facet of Justice Harlan's argument—
that
new
rules
be
J
u
s should
t
i retroactively enforceable in all cases where the
direct appeal was s till pending—was adopted by the Supreme Court
c
e
in 1987 in Griffith v. Kentucky.42 T wo years later, and quite controverH
a
r
l
sially,
a
n approach—that
,
Harlan's
new rules generally should not be retroactively
43
enforceable
via
habeas
corpus—in
Teague v. Lane.44 Although Justice
a
O'Connor's
defense
of
that
approach
largely reiterated Justice Harlan's
p l u
rationale
from Desist and Mackey, her analysis added two additional
r a l
layers.
First,
she reasoned that in habeas cases the Court should reach
i t y
the
retroactivity
of a new rule as a threshold matter, before deciding
o
whether
there should even be such a new rule. In her words:
f
t Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a
h new constitutional rule o f criminal procedure is applied to the
defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice
e
requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly
C situated. Thus, before deciding whether [there should be a new
o rule, we should ask] whether such a rule would be applied
u retroactively to the case at issue.
r 45
Second, while recognizing that "[i]t is admittedly often difficult to
t
determine
when a case announces a new rule," Justice O'Connor adopted
aa definition of what constituted a new rule that was far broader than any
d
reading
the Court had previously employed:
o
[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or
p imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.
t To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was
e not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
d conviction became final.
t 46
h
e
Id. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
s 41.
42.479 U.S. 314 (1987).
e 43. o n the controversy surrounding Teague, see EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE
RISE,
c FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 4 9 8
44. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). A majority would soon endorse the plurality's approach. See
o1 0 ( 2v. 0Minnesota,
5
0 5 ) . 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1032 n.I (2008) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
Danforth
313
(1989)).
n
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300-01 (pl ural i ty opinion).
d 45.
46. Id. at 301 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
f
a
c
e
t
o
f
J
u
s
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As later cases would clarify, the "dictated by precedent" standard
meant, as a practical matter, that even the most modest extensions of
existing precedent would be new rules—and therefore not generally
retroactively enforceable v ia habeas corpus—if any reasonable jurist
might have found the extension unwarranted.'" Thus, Teague simultaneously converted into new rules most decisions extending previously recognized rights into new contexts, and suggested that courts should not
enunciate such new rules unless it would matter in the case sub judice.
Seven years before AEDPA, then, Teague raised substantial hurdles to
48
the enunciation o f new principles o f constitutional law in criminal
cases.49
B. AEDPA, "Clearly Established" Federal Law, and the Order of Battle
The story behind AEDPA's enactment in 1996 has been well-told
elsewhere.
U.S.C.
5° A §s 2254 to provide that
r e [al ]le application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
v acustody
n t pursuant to the judgment o f a State court shall not be
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
f granted
o
in
State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
r
p u
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrear p
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as detero smined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . .
e s5 1
On its face, the biggest shift wrought by AEDPA was its requireo
ment that the baseline of federal law be "clearly established Federal law,
f
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Arguably,
t
Teague had already crafted something akin to the "clearly established"
h
requirement in its sweeping reformulation of the idea of new rules, but
iTeague had pointedly not limited the relevant body of precedent to just
sthe decisions of the Supreme Court. T o the contrary, the lower courts
E
continued to routinely apply circuit-level precedents in habeas cases in
sthe period between Teague and AEDPA.
s
a
y 47. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407
,(1990).
48. Whether Teague mandated such an order of battle has divided the lower courts. See CamA
piti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317, 321 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2003).
E 49. Needless to say, the Court was soundly criticized for doing so. Although the literature is
voluminous, a particularly significant contribution is Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
D
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HAM
50. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15.
P
,
.A L . 51.28
R U.S.C.
E V . * 2254(d)
1 7(1996).
3 1
( 1 9 9 1 ) .
r
e
w
r
o
t
e
2
8
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Furthermore, the n e w § 2254(d) raised a question o f statutory
interpretation that divided early courts: What does it actually mean for a
state court decision to be "contrary to, o r involv[ing] an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal la w" ?
5 2 question
this
T h e in Terry
C oWilliams
u r v.
t Taylor, decided in April 2000.
t
53
o
o
k
u
p
1. Terry Williams v. Taylor and Dicta About Dicta
At issue in Terry Williams was whether the petitioner had received
constitutionally ineffective assistance o f counsel because h is lawyers
failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence during
the sentencing phase o f his capital murder trial. Alth o u g h six Justices
agreed that Williams's Strickland claim was meritorious under AEDPA,
the six divided over what kind o f showing the new § 2254(d) required.
Justice Stevens—writing in dissent on behalf o f himself and Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—interpreted § 2254(d)(1) as not altering
the pre-AEDPA standard o f independent, de novo review o f federal constitutional questions. A s Justice Stevens explained,
[I]t is significant that the word "deference" does not appear in the
text o f the statute itself. Ne it h e r the legislative history nor the
statutory text suggests any difference in the so-called "deference"
depending on which of the two phrases ["contrary to" or "unreasonable application of"] is implicated. Whatever "deference" Congress
had in mind with respect to both phrases, it surely is not a requirement that federal courts actually defer to a state-court application of
the federal law that is, in the independent judgment o f the federal
court, in e rro r.
54
Writing fo r a majority as to the appropriate standard o f re vie w,
Justice
5 5O'Connor opined that AEDPA had to be understood as changing
the law, especially in light of the congressional intent behind the statute.
Suggesting that Justice Stevens's opinion " fa ils t o g ive independent
meaning to both the 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses
of the statute,"
56 can, under the 'contrary to ' clause, issue the writ whenever i t
court
J u s t i c e
O '52. C
o
See, e.g., Nee!ley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1998); Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d
n (n5th Cir.
o r1996); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), r ev' d on other
751
grounds,
c o 521n U.S. 320 (1997).
c l53. 529
u U.S.
d 362 (2000).
54. Id. at 386-87 (Stevens, J.) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868.
e 55.
d Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed with Justices
t
O'Connor
hand Kennedy that Williams was entitled to relief under AEDPA, they agreed with Justice
O'Connor's
a
t articulation of the standard of review under AEDPA. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 416
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
T 56. Id. at 404 (O'Connor, J.).
N
a
f
e
d
e
r
a
l
h
a
b
e
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concludes that the state court's application of clearly established federal
law was incorrect, the 'unreasonable application' clause becomes a
nullity ."
57
prong
of § 2254(d)(1) contemplated relief only in those cases where the
state
court's
decision was squarely in conflict with extant Supreme
I n s t
eCourt
a d precedent. Otherwise, the question devolved to the "unreasonable
application"
prong, under which "a federal habeas court may not issue
,
the
writ
simply
because that court concludes in its independent judgment
J u
that
the
relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal
s t
law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be
iunreasonable."
c
e58
Toward the end of her opinion, Justice O'Connor added a point that
O
' been addressed by Justice Stevens. Without any citation, Justice
had not
C
O'Connor observed that where § 2254(d)(1) refers to "clearly established
oFederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,"
nit "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, o f this Court's
ndecisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."
owords,
59 rI nin what
o t could
h e only
r be described as dicta itself, Justice O'Connor
cstated that only the holdings of the Supreme Court could form the basis
ofor habeas corpus relief under AEDPA, and nothing else. Expressions
nabout what the law should be, even if unanimous, would mean nothing if
cthey were completely unrelated to resolution of the merits of the appeal.
lThus, if the reviewing court concluded that the state court's decision was
unot "unreasonable," nothing the same court said about the merits could
dsubsequently form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.
e
2. Andrade and the Order of Battle
d
Notably, Justice O'Connor's opinion omitted any discussion about
t
the decisional order of battle in AEDPA cases—whether courts could
hfirst reach whether the state court's decision was erroneous before
a
assessing whether the error was reasonable. Suc h an omission was
tsignificant, given that reasonable jurists could certainly structure their
tdecisions in a way where resolution of the error question was not dicta,
hbut was instead necessarily antecedent to the question of entitlement to
erelief under AEDPA.
"
Less than a month after Terry Williams was decided, the Ninth
cCircuit answered the question of whether courts could first reach error in
othe affirmative, relying on the Court's (pre-Saucier) qualified immunity
n
t
57. Id. at 407.
r 58. Id. at 411.
a 59. Id. at 412.
r
y
t
o
"
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jurisprudence fo r support. A s Judge Reinhardt wrote fo r the panel in
Van Tran v. Lindsey,
Requiring federal courts to first determine whether the state court's
decision was erroneous, prior to considering whether it was contrary
to or involved an unreasonable application of controlling law under
AEDPA, promotes clarity in our own constitutional jurisprudence
and also provides guidance for state courts, which can look to our
decisions for their persuasive value. Such a rule also respects our
duty, as Article III judges, to say "what the law is." Accordingly,
we hold that, when analyzing a claim that there has been an unreasonable application o f federal law, we must first consider whether
the state court erred; only after we have made that determination
may we then consider whether any error involved an unreasonable
application of controlling law within the meaning of § 2254(d).
6°The Ninth Circuit was the only circuit court to mandate such a twostep analysis after Terry Williams .
6 1 Fifth
T wCircuits,
o
o squarely
t h erejected
r
the
that approach,
c i Second
, tthathit was
62
and
wr hc e uCircuits
r ei at s sheld
e permissible, but not mandatory, to
t
hr question
F
reach
i the
s e t o f error first .
F
o
u
r c kFirst
ty e
h r Second Circuits, holding that " AEDPA
6 3 I sided
Court
n
with
L o the
and
n
d
va
does
not
. require
a federal
habeas court to adopt any one methodology in
A n dthe ronly
deciding
a question
d e that
, matters under § 2254(d)(1)—whether a
t
state
co h
u rt decision
e
i s co n tra ry t o , o r in vo lve d a n unreasonable
S
application
u
of,
p clearly
r established
e
federal la w. "
due t o Andrade, the federal courts are allowed, b u t n o t
m4 Thus,
6
e
required, to reach whether the state court committed error before deciding whether that error was unreasonable. Nevertheless, in the six years
since Andrade was decided, the vast majority of AEDPA cases have seen
adjudication simila r to that undertaken b y the Supreme Court in Van
Patten; in cases where it was not strictly necessary to reach whether the
state c o u rt co mmitte d error—cases wh e re a n y e r r o r w a s n o t
60. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also id.
at 1155 n.17 ("The method we adopt does not require that we render advisory opinions. A s the
Court's reasoning in County of Sacramento makes clear, we cannot make a determination that a
decision is contrary to or involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
without implicitly commenting upon what the state of the law is. Given that we must necessarily
resolve questions of federal law whenever we address a habeas petition under AEDPA, it behooves
us to do so clearly and explicitly.") (citations omitted).
61. See Clark v. Murphy, 317 F.3d 1038, 1044 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003).
62. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 954 n.19 (5th Cir. 2001); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d
149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane).
63. See Kruelski v. Conn. Super. Ct. for the Judicial District of Dansbury, 316 F.3d 103 (2d
Cir. 2003); Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2001).
64. 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).

608

S e a t t l e

University Law Review

[ V o l .

32:595

unreasonable--courts have generally rested their decisions solely on the
reasonableness prong of § 2254(d)(1). With no compulsion to reach the
error question first, there has simply been no incentive for courts to
expend precious resources in cases where such analysis does not make a
difference. Instead, as in Van Patten, criminal defendants are left to their
direct appeals, and their direct appeals only, to pursue claims based on
new law
.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THESAUCIERSEQUENCE
Although c iv il suits against government officers for damages—
where qualified immu n ity defenses typ ica lly arise—are quite distinct

from habeas cases, there are significant similarities between resolution of
qualified immunity and AEDPA relief. L i k e post-conviction habeas
cases under AEDPA, a defense o f qualified immu n ity to a damages

action against a government officer generally turns on two questions:
whether the officer's alleged conduct violated a right held by the
plaintiff, and whether that right was clearly established such that a
reasonable officer should have known that his conduct was unlawful.
65
And, as in AEDPA cases, the officer will prevail i f the answer to either
question is no. Thus , qualified immunity cases, in the abstract, raise
similar issues concerning the ordering of judicial decision making and
the possibility that the relevant substantive law w ill be "frozen" by
judicial reliance on the non-rights prong in denying relief in the vast
majority of cases.

For a time, the Supreme Court's approach in qualified immunity
cases resembled the approach that it appeared to endorse in AEDPA
cases in Andrade—favoring resolution of the rights question first, but not

requiring as much. As Justice Souter explained in County of Sacramento
v. Lewis,

the better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has
alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all. Normally, it is
only then that a court should ask whether the right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the time of the events in question.
66

This ordering was preferable, Justice Souter explained, because " if the
policy of avoidance were always followed in favor of ruling on qualified
immunity whenever there was no clearly settled constitutional rule o f

65. The contemporary standard for qualified immunity has its origins in the Supreme Court's
decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
66. 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (emphasis added).
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primary conduct, standards o f official conduct would tend to remain
uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and individuals."
67 Three years later, at the end of its 2000 Term, the Court mandated
such a methodology in Saucier v. Katz .
68
A. Saucier
Although the question presented in Saucier turned on the particular
complexities of assessing qualified immunity defenses in excessive force
cases, Justice Kennedy began his opinion for the Court by emphasizing
that the purpose of a qualified immunity defense—to resolve the officer's
immunity a t the earliest possible stage o f the litigation—requires
reviewing courts to first ensure that the plaintiff has alleged the violation
of a constitutional right before reaching whether that right was clearly
established, and whether the officer is therefore liable. A s he explained,
A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must
consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the lig h t most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show
the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Th is must be
the initial inquiry. I n the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find
it necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for a
holding that a right is clearly established. This is the process for the

law's elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our
insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. Th e law might be deprived of this
explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question
whether the law clearly established that the officer's conduct was
unlawful in the circumstances of the case.
I f no constitutional right would have been violated were the

allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity.
69to Justice Kennedy, rights-first adjudication served the dual purThus,
poses of allowing for "the law's elaboration from case to case," and potentially allowing for the resolution of suits challenging official action at
an earlier stage, to spare the officer from the cost of further litigation.

67. Id. (also noting that T i n practical terms, escape from uncertainty would require the issue
to arise i n a suit to enjoin future conduct, i n an action against a municipality, or in litigating a
suppression motion in a criminal proceeding; in none of these instances would qualified immunity be
available to block a determination of law").
68. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
69. Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
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Curiously, though, Justice Kennedy offered no explanation in his
opinion f o r why i t was necessary t o mandate such an approach,
as opposed to the approach adopted by the Court in earlier cases—of
preferring such a methodology as the better approach in most cases.
Certainly, in cases where the scope of a constitutional right was unclear,
it would be far less taxing for the court—and the litigants—to simply
grant qualified immunity on the ground that the law was not clearly
established than to first clarify the law.
Such an omission is all the more inexplicable given that, in her
concurrence in the judgment, Justice Ginsburg suggested that excessive
force cases were one of the few sets o f cases where such a two-step
analysis did not make sense:
[P]aradigmatically, th e determination o f police misconduct i n
excessive force cases and the availability o f qualified immunity
both hinge on the same question: Taking into account the particular
circumstances confronting the defendant officer, could a reasonable
officer, identically situated, have believed the force employed was
lawful? Nothing more and nothing else need be answered in this
case.70

Yet, although Justices Stevens and Breyer joined i n Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence, none o f them objected to adoption o f the two-

step sequence i n other contexts, o r t o the notion that rights-first
adjudication would usually serve the beneficial purpose o f developing
constitutional doctrine, even in cases where the officers ultimately were

entitled to immunity. T he fault line, instead, turned simply on whether
the Saucier sequence was to apply in all cases.
B. The (Growing) Criticisms o f the Saucier Sequence
Very quickly, however, the inflexibility o f the so-called "Saucier

sequence" became a lightning rod for lower court judges, commentators,
and even the Justices themselves. Perhaps foremost among the critics
has been Justice Breyer, beginning in Brosseau v. Ha g a n ,
7
1 a with
n d his concurrence
c u l m i in- Scott v. Harris:
nating

70. Id. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
71. See 543 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) ( " 1
quires- courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions when there is available an
easier1basis
qualified
that will satisfactorily resolve the case before
1 h e forc the
u rdecision
r e n (e.g.,
t
r u l immunity)
e
the court,
a-rigid 'order of battle' makes little administrar i Indeed
g i when
d courts'
l y docketsrare crowded,
e
tive sense and can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insulated from
review. For these reasons, I think we should reconsider this issue.") (citation omitted).
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Sometimes (e.g., where a defendant is clearly entitled to qualified
immunity) Saucier's fixe d order-of-battle ru le wastes ju d icia l
resources i n that i t ma y require courts t o answer a d ifficu lt
constitutional question unnecessarily. Sometimes (e.g., where the
defendant loses the constitutional question but wins on qualified
immunity) that order-of-battle rule ma y immunize an incorrect
constitutional ruling from review. Sometimes, as here, the order-ofbattle rule will spawn constitutional rulings in areas o f law so fact
dependent that the result will be confusion rather than clarity. A n d
frequently the order-of-battle rule violates that older, wiser judicial
counsel "not to pass on questions o f constitutionality u n l e s s
such adjudication is unavoidable." I n a sharp departure from this
counsel, Saucier requires courts to embrace unnecessary constitutional questions not to avoid them.
72
Justices Stevens a n d Sca lia have jo in e d i n Justice B re ye r's
critiques,
73 evaluations, both o n
their
a 4nparticular
7
the
a
d n d concerns
o f f raised by Justice Breyer, lower court judges have
m 5o t h et d ifhficu elt y o f resolving constitutional questions o n a n
7
noted
s t e n c (hi f not
b
underdeveloped
. completely undeveloped) factual record, given
l odefendants
M
that
o r e are
o often allowed to take an interlocutory appeal fro m
vw e denials
pre-trial
r , of qualified immu n ity.
ir 6 Finally,n in academic circles, a host o f commentators have decried
7
c
a
o d as the
d moi st egregious in a growing body o f federal co u rt
Saucier
tu
r
i
o
decisions openingnthe door to unnecessary judicial decisions on constitut
tional
questions a pattern that raises serious policy concerns, and that
j
o
u
d
g 72. 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Morse v.
e
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring i n the judgment i n part and
dissenting
in part) (making a similar argument).
s
73. See, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
h
concurring i n the judgment); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1019-20 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
a
respecting
the denial o f certiorari); id. at 1022-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial o f
certiorari).
v
e 74. See, e.g., Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007), rev 'd sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009); MeClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007); Ehrlich
b Town of Glastonbury, 348 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dep't, 315 F.3d 65
v.
(1st
e Cir. 2002). F or a particularly thorough—and widely cited—discussion, see Lyons v. City of
Xenia,
417 F.3d 565, 582-85 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring).
e
75. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
n
REV. 1249, 1275 (2006).
e 76. On the appealability of denials of qualified immunity, see Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
299
q (1996), and Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995). F or the difficulties appellate courts face
deciding
such claims on skimpy records, see Lyons, 417 F.3d at 582 (Sutton, J., concurring), and
u
Wong v. U.S. 3 7 3 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004).
a
l
l
y
u
n
a
b
a
s
h
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perhaps may even implicate constitutional values?' Although the criticism of Saucier has hardly been unanimous:
abandoning
78 t h e the
m Saucier
o m esequence
n t u led
m to the Supreme Court's decision in
Pearson
decided that Saucier should
i
n v. Callahan,
f where
a
vit unanimously
o
r
be
overruled.
Justice
Alito's
opinion
for
the
Court
was unhesitating in its
o
f
criticism o f the mandatory approach to resolving qualified immunity
cases.79 Nonetheless, the Court was careful to suggest that it was still
preferable, in the run of cases, for courts to reach the rights question first.
As Justice Alito explained, "Our decision does not prevent the lower
courts from following the Saucier procedure; it simply recognizes that
those courts should have the discretion to decide whether that procedure
is worthwhile in particular cases."
8° Although 1 have my own views on the Court's decision i n
Callahan, the point of this Essay is to consider whether something akin
to Saucier's methodology might make more sense in AEDPA cases,
regardless o f Callahan's abrogation o f such an approach in qualified
immunity cases. T o that end, my remaining focus is on whether the
various critiques o f Saucier have lesser force in the context of postconviction habeas.
C. Exporting the Saucier Sequence to AEDPA Cases
To briefly recap from above, we might summarize Justice Breyer's
objections to Saucier as encompassing three distinct concerns, and the
objections by lower court judges as adding a fourth: (1) that Saucier
required courts to reach constitutional questions that were otherwise unnecessary to resolve the case before them; (2) that Saucier led to "certproof' judgments because defendants had little-to-no incentive to appeal
adverse constitutional rulings when they prevailed on immunity grounds
anyway; (3) that Saucier spawned incredibly fact-specific constitutional
holdings in areas where idiosyncrasies o f individual cases reduce the
value of precedent; and (4) that Saucier required reviewing courts to
decide constitutional questions on sparse factual records.
The "sparse-record" critique is readily disposed of in the context of
post-conviction habeas cases under AEDPA, since the statute requires
77. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV.
847 (2005).
78. See. e.g., John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999); Sam Kamin,
An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued
Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53 (2008), Michael L. Wells, The "Order-ofBattle" in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1539 (2007).
79. See 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-18 (2009) (summarizing the criticism of Saucier).
80. Id. at 821.
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that the federal constitutional claim be fully and fairly presented to the
state courts. A s a result, the problem o f an underdeveloped record
should be nonexistent in post-conviction cases.
Justice Breyer's concerns, on the other hand, require a bit more
consideration. Wit h regard to his second concern with the problem of
cert-proof judgments, one response may be that in AEDPA cases, it is
only Supreme Court precedent that can form the basis for relief A s
such, it will usually be the Supreme Court itself that pronounces such
forward-looking principles, decisions that are, by definition, not certproof. A s for the lower courts, they are only allowed to look to (and
apply) extant Supreme Court case law as a basis for relief Although it is
certainly possible that the lower courts w ill commit error simply in
applying previous and well-established Supreme Court precedents, such
a possibility is far more remote than in the qualified immunity context,
where appellate courts are free to apply their own precedents as well.
Accordingly, the concern with cert-proof objections is legitimately
diluted in the context of AEDPA cases.
Justice Breyer's third concern—that Saucier requires the formulation o f constitutional law in cases with highly specific fact patterns,
leading to idiosyncratic constitutional rules—is certainly also an issue in
AEDPA cases. Ev en focusing only on Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, claims of specific misconduct by attorneys
may well lead to highly fact-specific applications of the Strickland rule,
as typified in the Court's recent decisions in Wiggins v. Smith
Rompilla
81 a n v.d Beard.
range
yet constitutionally material—facts in post82 Bofuidiosyncratic—and
t
conviction
cases
is
far
narrower
than the comparable range in damages
i t
i s
cases.
there are far fewer rights for state courts to violate in
p r Put
o bsimply,
a
a
criminal
trial
than
there are for a state officer to violate in everyday
b l y
contact
with
citizens
at
large. Again, my point is not that these concerns
u n c o n
disappear altogether in the context of AEDPA cases; rather, it is that
tthese
r concerns
o v e have
r at least somewhat less suasion.
s i a l
Another larger point bears emphasizing, especially as it relates to
tJustice Breyer's first—and the most widely-shared—critique of Saucier,
o
i.e., that a rigid order-of-battle requires courts to unnecessarily reach
n
constitutional questions. Ther e is no doubt that, on the surface, this
o
concern istat least as present in AEDPA cases as in qualified immunity
e
cases
where the law is not clearly established and r elief is thus
t
foreclosed.
However, there is an obvious and vital distinction between
h
a
t 81. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
82. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
t
h
e
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the two bodies of law. I n qualified immunity cases, a failure to enunciate
a principle of constitutional law at T
commits
o d o esimilar
s
nconduct
o t at T
that
the
plaintiff
is
not
to damages for the officer's transgression.
1
h
a
s
a
c
t
eentitled
d
m e a n
The
plaintiff
may
still
pursue
other
non-monetary remedies against the
lt a hw fa u tl l y ;
officer,
ra a and
t the
h officer
e rmay well face disciplinary action for his offense.
n
In
AEDPA
cases,
83
,o
f
fi
c
e in
r contrast, a failure to enunciate a particular
principle
at
T
iw
th
o
and
so
a
defendant
o
w
i
l
l
m
e
a who might otherwise have been entitled to a new
trial—if
not to outright release—remains incarcerated. Put another way,
u
n s usa l
there
is
at
least a colorable argument that the failure to enunciate
lo y
n
l
forward-looking
principles in qualified immunity cases does not forever
b
a
yenshrine
what the relevant officer did, whereas a similar failure in
r
AEDPA cases does insulate the state court from any repercussions for its
a
n
failure to reach the "correct" result. Thus, what is unnecessary in the
y
context of civil-rights damages actions may be absolutely necessary in
f
o
the context o f other criminal defendants facing incarceration or even
rexecution,
m and the canonical reliance on the doctrine of constitutional
oavoidance may be quite myopic.
f
Thus, the most common critiques of the Saucier sequence have less
rforce when
e
applied to post-conviction habeas cases under AEDPA.
l
i
Moreover,
as discussed previously, there are compelling reasons to
eimportf the rigid order-of-battle prescribed by Saucier into the context of
o
post-conviction
habeas cases under AEDPA, and even those that fall outrside o f AEDPA but nevertheless implicate Teague's retroactivity
ranalysis. So long as the relevant court has the power to reach the merits
eof the petitioner's habeas claim, I believe it has an obligation n o t just to
that
m petitioner, but to similarly situated criminal defendants whose claims
ehave not yet ripened—to identify constitutional errors even when those
errors cannot form the basis for relief.
d
y
D. Counterarguments
a
l
That is not to say that there are not compelling counterarguments
t
o
to my thesis—and from both directions, at that. For starters, it is incong
e
sistent with the Supreme Court's own precedent because the Court
t
h
specifically disavowed such an approach in Andrade, which abrogated
ethe Ninth
r Circuit's earlier decision in Van Trait Under Andrade, habeas
,courts are free to reach the state court's error first; they are just not
required to do so. Thus, for my thesis to work, it would require the Court
83. See, e.g., Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 822; see also County o f Sacramento v . Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 841 n.5 (1998).
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itself to change course and reconsider its brief discussion of this point in
Andrade."
Second, and relatedly, is the question of why the Andrade standard
is insufficient. I f courts are free to reach error in AEDPA cases before
reaching the reasonableness o f the error, why compel—rather than
encourage—them to do so? T h is was the Callahan Court's central
argument against Saucier, and I suspect it is also the strongest counterweight to the proposal I have advanced herein. The short answer is anecdotal: since Andrade was decided, the vast majority of courts just haven't reached the error question fi rs t i n cases where i t has not
mattered. Some judges do, to be sure, but the decision whether or not to
formulate forward-looking principles of constitutional law hardly seems
like the kind of responsibility that we should leave to the discretion of
the judge, or to the vagaries o f which judges end up deciding which
cases.
Third, a rigid order-of-battle in AEDPA cases would unquestionably increase the workload on already-overworked district judges, who are
already overburdened, and w h o might n o t tak e k indly t o t h e
burden o f resolving questions unrelated to the disposition of the case
before them. A s noted by Justice Alito in Callahan, a strict order-ofbattle "sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial
resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the
case.... District courts and courts of appeals with heavy caseloads are
often understandably unenthusiastic about what may seem to be an
essentially academic exercise."
more
compelling
85 O
n
t hreason
e to impose such a burden in habeas cases than in
damages
given that the court's opinion may well prove
o t h lawsuits,
e r
dispositive
in
a
host
h a n d , of cases not then pending.
t
h
e
r
e
IV. CONCLUSION
m
i
g
h
In a way, this is a strange Essay, for it is meant to mitigate the
t
impact
of a statute
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed by
b
e
adopting
an
approach
that it has specifically rejected. I t should go
a
without
saying
that
part
o f the motivation is my own distaste for the
f
a
deferential review mandated by AEDPA in an area where the Court had
r
already done quite a lot to tip the scales in the state courts' favor.

84. Of course, Congress could amend AEDPA to require such an approach, but I assume for
purposes of this Essay that AEDPA remains on the books as is. I f the I I Ith Congress chooses to
revisit AEDPA, I suspect that the order-of-battle would be the least of its concerns—and that the
AEDPA-centric argument I make in this Essay would quickly become moot.
85. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
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That being said, my goal is rather modest. I do not mean to suggest
a wholesale reconceptualization o f the purpose(s) o f post-conviction
habeas corpus, or to identify a magic bullet to solve the difficult
questions arising from the formulation of new rules in criminal cases and
their retroactive application, or even to suggest that the rule for which I
am arguing has any constitutional underpinnings. Rather, the purpose of
this Essay is merely to suggest that, owing to a combination of the
language of AEDPA and to the Court's own development of its habeas
corpus jurisprudence, the substantive merits of habeas cases matter even
when they are not dispositive, and the Supreme Court's avoidance of
resolving constitutional questions comes at the specific and concrete
expense of future criminal defendants whose liberty turns not on what
the law actually is, but on when it is finally pronounced. This is a trap
that the Supreme Court has set for itself, and one that it can maneuver
out of with little in the way of doctrinal displacement. M y proposal—
that the Supreme Court should export the now-rejected Saucier sequence
into the context of AEDPA cases—is hardly a perfect solution, or one
that would come without substantial costs to lawyers and judges alike.
But if cases like Van Patten are any indication, such a model of rightsfirst constitutional adjudication is immensely preferable to the status quo.

